BonJours Basic Antifoundationalist Argument :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

BonJours staple Antifoundationalist commandABSTRACT BonJour argues that there raft be no basic data-based article of beliefs. But premises iii and four jointly entail BonJours Rule ones belief that p is reassert exclusively if one justifiably believes the premises of an argument that makes p highly plausibly which, given human psychology, entails global skepticism. His responses to the charge of skepticism, restricting premise three to basic beliefs and noting that the Rule does not require explicit belief, fail. Moreover, the Rule does not express an epistemic duty. Finally, his argument against this fails since it is false that if an experiential state has figural content, then it is in need of justification. I venture the diagnosis that BonJour mistook the depictive content of a cognitive state for the assertive functional function of a belief. Foundationalism may well be false, but not for BonJours reasons. Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism te nd to argue against it by objecting to relatively idiosyncratic versions of it, a scheme which has proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately futile since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly. (1) BonJour aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, the pattern of a basic empirical belief, is incoherent. (2) This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even if, in the end, as I shall argue, it fails. But, first, what is foundationalism? A psyches belief is nonbasic just in case it is confirm in virtue of its semblance to other justified beliefs it is basic just in case it is justified but not in virtue of its relation to other justified beliefs. Foundationalism is the view that if one has a nonbasic belief, then in the final analysis it is justified in virtue of its relation to a basic belief. Basic beliefs comprise the foundation of a persons network of justified beliefs. Now to BonJours argument.1. The Argument StatedBonJour summarizes it like this1. Suppose, for reductio, that there are basic empirical beliefs.2. A belief is justified only if there is a reason wherefore it is seeming to be true.3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a reason.4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true.